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Quantum games have proposed a new point of view for the solution of the classical problems
and dilemmas in game theory. It has been shown that are more efficient than classical games
and provide a saturated upper bound for this efficiency. Certain quantization relationships can
be proposed with the objective that a game can be generalized into a quantum domain where the
linear superposition of actions is allowed. This quantization let us describe and solution problems
originated by conflicting or cooperative behaviors among the members of a system from the point
of view of quantum mechanical interactions. This leads us to interesting aspects which only can
be observed through the quantization of a game like the possibility of the entanglement between
players, the definition of a socioeconomical temperature in a system and the analysis of a game
through elements of quantum information theory.
Although both systems analyzed are described through two theories apparently different (quan-
tum mechanics and game theory) both are analogous and thus exactly equivalents. The quantum
analogue of the replicator dynamics is the von Neumann equation. The classical equilibrium con-
cepts in game theory can be also generalized through a maximum entropy approach in the so called
Collective Welfare Principle. Nature is a game in where its players compete for the equilibrium of
the system that they are members. They act as a whole besides individuals like they obey a rule
in where they prefer to work for the collective besides the individual welfare. If it is maximized
the welfare of the individual above the collective welfare the system gets unstable and eventually it
collapses.
Quantum mechanics (and physics) could be used to explain more correctly biological and eco-
nomical processes (econophysics). A special consequence of the relationships between quantum
mechanics and game theory is analyzed. It is shown that the so called “globalization” process (i.e.,
the inexorable integration of markets, currencies, nation-states, technologies and the intensification
of consciousness of the world as a whole) has a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is tend-
ing to a maximum entropy state i.e., to its state of equilibrium. This let us predict the apparition of
big common markets and strong common currencies that will reach the “equilibrium” by decreasing
its number until they get a state characterized by only one common currency and only one big
common community around the world.
PACS numbers: 03.65.-w, 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 89.65.Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
The present work offers an overview of game theory.
Starting from the classical theory the basic concepts of
game, strategy, equilibrium, the evolutionary theory, the
replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategies
and a review of the most important works in the recent
field of quantum game theory, its importance, and how
the quantization can improve the results in a game and
solution the dilemmas of game theory. Finally, we ana-
lyze the relationships between game theory and quantum
mechanics, its consequences and applications.
II. GAME THEORY: FROM NASH TO THE
REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
A. Classical Game Theory
Game theory [1–3] is the study of decision making of
competing agents in some conflict situation. It tries to
understand the birth and development of conflicting or
cooperative behaviors among a group of individuals who
behave rationally and strategically according to their per-
sonal interests. Each member in the group strive to max-
imize its welfare, state, utilities or payoffs by choosing
the best courses of strategies from a cooperative or indi-
vidual point of view. Game theory has been applied to
solve many problems in economics, social sciences, biol-
ogy, computer science, international relations, engineer-
ing and more recently, in physics.
21. Basic Definitions
A game G = (N,S,E) consists of a set of players N ,
a set of strategies S = {S1, ..., SN}, where Sj is the set
of strategies available to the jth player and a set of pay-
off functions E = {E1, ..., EN}, where Ej is the payoff
function for the jth player. A payoff function E for a
player is a mapping from the cross-product of player’s
strategy spaces to the player’s set of payoffs. E assigns
a real number to the pair (si, sj), E(si, sj) is the payoff
obtained by a player who plays the strategy si against
an opponent who plays the strategy sj . An action or a
move is a choice available to a player. It could be taken
by a player during some moment in a game.
2. Strategies
A strategy is a complete plan of action for every stage
of the game, regardless of whether that stage actually
arises in play. A strategy space for a player is the set of
all strategies available to the player. A pure strategy is a
strategy that specifies a unique move in a given game po-
sition, i.e., an action with probability 1. A mixed strategy
x is a probability distribution over S which corresponds
to how frequently each move is chosen. A dominant strat-
egy is a strategy that does at least as well as any com-
peting strategy against any possible moves by the other
player(s).
3. Games
A zero sum game is a game in where the sum of all
players payoffs is zero regardless of the strategies they
choose. A player gains only at the expense of others. In
a constant-sum game, the sum of all players’ payoffs is
the same for any outcome. A cooperative game is a game
in which two or more players strive toward a unique ob-
jective and therefore win or lose as a group. In a non-
cooperative game no outside authority assures that play-
ers stick to the same predetermined rules, and so binding
agreements are not feasible. In these games players may
cooperate but any cooperation must be self-enforcing. In
a game of perfect information the knowledge about other
players is available to all participants i.e., every player
knows the payoff functions and the strategies available
to other players. A symmetric game is a game in where
all agents have the same set of strategies and identical
payoffs functions, except for the interchange of roles of
the players. A symmetric two-person game G = (S,E)
consists of a finite nonempty pure strategy set S and a
payoff function E which assigns a real number to the pair
(si, sj). A n1 × n2 × ... × nN game is a N player game
where the jth player has available nj strategies.
4. Equilibrium Notions
Let be p, r ∈ Si and q ∈ Sj . A best reply to q is a
strategy p which maximizes E(p, q). A dominant strategy
equilibrium is a strategy profile in which each player plays
best replies that do not depend on the strategies of other
players. An equilibrium point is a pair (p, q) with the
property that p and q are best replies to each other. A
strategy r is a strict best reply to a strategy q if it is
the only best reply to q. A strict best reply must be a
pure strategy. An equilibrium point (p, q) is called strict
equilibrium point if p and q are strict best replies to each
other. A best reply to p which is different from p is called
alternative best reply.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) [4, 5] is a set of strategies, one
for each player, such that no player has an incentive to
unilaterally change his action. Players are in equilibrium
if a change in strategies by any one of them would lead
that player to earn less than if he remained with his cur-
rent strategy. A Nash equilibrium satisfies the following
condition
E(p, p) ≥ E(r, p). (1)
A player cannot increase his payoff if he decides to play
the strategy r instead of p. A focal point is one amongst
several NE which for psychological reasons is particularly
compelling.
In a zero-sum game between players A and B, player A
should attempt to minimize player B’s maximum payoff
while player B attempts to maximize his own minimum
payoff. When they do so the minimum of the maximum
(minimax) payoffs equals the maximum of the minimum
(maximin) payoffs. Neither player can improve his posi-
tion, and so these strategies form an equilibrium of the
game. The minimax theorem [1] states that for every
two-person, zero-sum game, there always exists a mixed
strategy for each player such that the expected payoff for
one player is the same as the expected cost for the other.
In other words, there is always a rational solution to a
precisely defined conflict between two people whose in-
terests are completely opposite. It is a rational solution
in that both parties can convince themselves that they
cannot expect to do any better, given the nature of the
conflict.
A Pareto optimal (PO) [6] is a game result from which
no player can improve their payoff without another player
being worse off, that is, if ∀k, ∃l such that
Ek(s1, ..., s
′
k, sl, ..., sN ) > Ek(s1, ..., sk, sl, ..., sN ),
then El(s1, ..., s
′
k, sl, ..., sN ) < El(s1, ..., sk, sl, ..., sN).
(2)
Then the unprimed strategy profile is Pareto optimal.
An outcome of a game is Pareto optimal if there is no
other outcome that makes every player at least as well
off and at least one player strictly better off. That is, a
Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon with-
out hurting at least one player.
3B. Evolutionary Game Theory
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of pop-
ulation dynamical methods to game theory. It has been
introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part
by classical game theorists [7] and first introduced under
the name of evolutionary game theory by J. Smith and
G. Price in the context of animal conflict [8]. Evolu-
tionary game theory [7, 9, 10] does not rely on rational
assumptions (like classical game theory) but on the idea
that the Darwinian process of natural selection [11] drives
organisms towards the optimization of reproductive suc-
cess [12]. It combines the principles of game theory, evo-
lution, non linear dynamics and dynamical systems to
explain the distribution of different phenotypes in bio-
logical populations. Instead of working out the optimal
strategy, the different phenotypes in a population are as-
sociated with the basic strategies that are shaped by trial
and error by a process of natural selection or learning.
Strategies are considered to be inherited programs for
any conceivable situation which control the individual’s
behavior. The members of a population interact in game
situations and the joint action of mutation and selection
replaces strategies by others with a higher reproductive
success. In this kind of games is less important to know
which member plays which strategy within a population
but it is important to know the relative frequency of ac-
tions (the probability of playing a strategy) [12]. Payoffs
in biological games are in terms of fitness a measure of
reproductive success.
In contrast with classical game theory its evolutionary
version deals with entire populations of players, all “pro-
grammed” to use some strategy (or type of behavior).
Strategies with high payoff will spread within the popu-
lation (this can be achieved by learning, by copying or
inheriting strategies, or even by infection). The payoffs
depend on the actions of the coplayers and hence on the
frequencies of the strategies within the population. Since
these frequencies change according to the payoffs, this
yields a feedback loop [7]. The dynamics of this feedback
loop is the object of evolutionary game theory. The feed-
back dynamics depend strongly, of course, on the popu-
lation structure, on the underlying game and on the way
strategies spread. Thus there are many “game dynam-
ics”, which can be discrete or continuous, stochastic or
deterministic [7, 10, 13, 14].
Many successful applications of evolutionary game the-
ory appeared in mathematical biology to explain biolog-
ical phenomena (e.g., to predict the behavior of bacteria
and insects) but it can also be used to interpret classical
games from a different perspective. Instead of directly
calculating properties of a game, populations of players
using different strategies are simulated and a process sim-
ilar to natural selection is used to determine how the
population evolves. This is made through the stability
analysis of differential equations and the implications to
the games [13].
1. Evolutionary Stable Strategies
The central equilibrium concept of evolutionary game
theory is the notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategy
(ESS) introduced by J. Smith and G. Price [8, 9]. An
ESS is described as a strategy which has the property
that if all the members of a population adopt it, no mu-
tant strategy could invade the population under the in-
fluence of natural selection. ESS are interpreted as stable
results of processes of natural selection. The natural se-
lection process that determines how populations playing
specific strategies evolve is known as the replicator dy-
namics [7, 10, 13, 14] whose stable fixed points are Nash
equilibria [2].
Each agent in a n-player game (where the ith player
has as strategy space Si) is modeled by a population of
players which have to be partitioned into groups. Individ-
uals in the same group would all play the same strategy.
Randomly, we make play the members of the subpopu-
lations against each other. The subpopulations that per-
form the best will grow and those that do not will shrink
and eventually will vanish. The process of natural selec-
tion assures survival of the best players at the expense
of the others. A population equilibrium occurs when the
population shares are such that the expected payoffs for
all strategies are equal.
Consider a large population in which a two person
game G = (S,E) is played by randomly matched pairs of
animals generation after generation. Let p be the strat-
egy played by the vast majority of the population, and let
r be the strategy of a mutant present in small frequency.
Both p and r can be pure or mixed. An evolutionary
stable strategy (ESS) p of a symmetric two-person game
G = (S,E) is a pure or mixed strategy for G which sat-
isfies the following two conditions
E(p, p) > E(r, p),
If E(p, p) = E(r, p) then E(p, r) > E(r, r). (3)
Since the stability condition only concerns to alternative
best replies, p is always evolutionarily stable if (p, p) is
an strict equilibrium point. An ESS is also a Nash equi-
librium since it is the best reply to itself and the game is
symmetric. The set of all the strategies that are ESS is a
subset of the NE of the game. A population which plays
an ESS can withstand an invasion by a small group of
mutants playing a different strategy. It means that if a
few individuals which play a different strategy are intro-
duced into a population in an ESS, the selection process
would eventually eliminate the invaders.
2. The Replicator Dynamics
The natural selection process that determines how
populations playing specific strategies evolve is known
as the replicator dynamics. It describes the evolution
of a polymorphic state in a population represented by
4a mixed strategy x for G whose members are involved
in a conflict described by a symmetric two-person game
G = (S,E). The probability assigned to a pure strategy
s is denoted by x(s). If si, i = 1, ..., n ∈ S are the pure
strategies available to a player, then the player’s strategy
will be denoted by the column vector x with xi ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The ith component of x gives the
probability of playing strategy si and also is interpreted
as the relative frequency of individuals using strategy si.
Playing a pure strategy sj is represented by the vector x
whose jth component is 1, and all the other components
are 0. The fitness function E = fi(x), i = 1, ..., n spec-
ifies how successful each subpopulation is and must be
defined for each component of x. The fitness for xi is the
expected utility of playing strategy si against a player
with a mixed strategy defined by the vector x. It is given
by
fi(x) = (Ax)i =
n∑
j=1
aijxj , (4)
where A is the payoff matrix (aij are its elements) and the
subscript i = 1, ..., n in (Ax)i denotes the ith component
of the matrix-vector product (Ax). The average fitness
of the population 〈f(x)〉 =∑ni=1 xifi(x) is
〈f(x)〉 = xTAx =
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl, (5)
where the superscript T denotes transpose.
The evolution of relative frequencies in a population is
described by the replicator dynamics
dxi(t)
dt
= [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉]xi(t),
dxi(t)
dt
=
[
(Ax)i − xTAx
]
xi(t), (6)
or also
dxi(t)
dt
=

 n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl

xi(t). (7)
The stable fixed points of the replicator dynamics are
Nash equilibria. It is important to note that the fixed
points of a system do not change in the time. It means
that if a population reaches a state which is a Nash equi-
librium, it will remain there. The replicator dynamics
rewards strategies that outperform the average by in-
creasing their frequency, and penalizes poorly performing
strategies by decreasing their frequency.
In a symmetric game payoff matrices and actions are
identical for both agents. These games can be modeled
by a single population of individuals playing against each
other. When the game is asymmetric, a different popu-
lation of players must be used to simulate each agent.
The strategy vector for player one is represented by x
and for player two is represented by y. Player one has
n strategies s1i ∈ S1, i = 1, ..., n and player two has m
strategies s2j ∈ S2, j = 1, ...,m. Each player will have
also a distinct payoff matrix A ∈ Rn×m and B ∈ Rm×n,
respectively. The fitness for a player who plays the strat-
egy s1i will be f1i = (Ay)i and the average fitness of
the first population will be 〈f1〉 = xTAy. Similarly, the
fitness for a player who plays the strategy s2i will be
f2i = (Bx)i and the average fitness of the second popu-
lation will be 〈f2〉 = yTBx. The evolution of this game
would be described for the next equations system [7]
dxi(t)
dt
=
[
(Ay)1 − xTAy
]
xi(t),
dyi(t)
dt
=
[
(Bx)1 − yTBx
]
yi(t). (8)
III. QUANTUM MECHANICS FOUNDATIONS
A. Physical System Representation
Lets represent a physical system through a Hilbert
space. A state of that system is completely described
through a state vector |Ψ(t)〉 (element of that Hilbert
space) and it is postulated that contains all the informa-
tion about that system. The possible configurations of a
physical system are described by the state space which is
spanned by a set of basis states B. The number of basis
states equals the dimension of the state space which can
be infinite and even uncountable. A basis state i ∈ B is
denoted by |i〉 and every state |Ψ〉 can be described with
a linear combination on their basis states B
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i∈B
αi |i〉 (9)
with αi ∈ C. It can be shown that the inner product in
the Hilbert space relates to the probability amplitudes in
quantum mechanics and viceversa. By definition
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i∈B
|i〉 〈i |Ψ〉 . (10)
The probability of measuring a state |Ψ〉 in the basis
state i equals | 〈i |Ψ〉 |2 which satisfies a normalization
condition
∑
i∈B | 〈i |Ψ 〉 |2 = 1 for every |Ψ〉 in the Hilbert
space.
In classical mechanics we can precisely specify the state
of a system by one point in its phase space. Its trajectory
through the phase space describes the time evolution of
the system and this evolution follows Newton’s laws or
Hamilton equations. When the information about the
system is incomplete the state of a system is not perfectly
defined for which we have to describe our system in terms
of probabilities.
An ensemble is a collection of identically prepared
physical systems. When each member of the ensem-
ble is characterized by the same state vector |Ψ(t)〉 it
is called pure ensemble. If each member has a proba-
bility pi of being in the state |Ψi(t)〉 we have a mixed
5ensemble. Each member of a mixed ensemble is a pure
state and its evolution is given by Schro¨dinger equation.
Probabilities for each state are constrained to satisfy
the normalization condition
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 and obviously
0 ≤ p1, p2, ..., pn ≤ 1.
An observable is a property of the system state that can
be determined by some sequence of physical operations.
Observables in our model are represented through Her-
mitian (or self adjoint) operators acting over the Hilbert
space. An operator A is Hermitian when A = A†. Ev-
ery operator can be represented in matrix form in some
basis. In quantum physics we can know only the ex-
pectation value of an observable. Suppose we make a
measurement on a mixed ensemble of some observable
A. The ensemble average of A is defined by the average
of the expected values measured in each member of the
ensemble described by |Ψi(t)〉 and with probability pi,
〈A〉ρ = p1 〈A〉1 + p2 〈A〉2 + ...+ pn 〈A〉n
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i=1
pi 〈Ψi(t)|A |Ψi(t)〉 ,
〈A〉ρ =
n∑
i,j,k=1
piajkc
(i)∗
j (t)c
(i)
k (t), (11)
where ajk are the elements of the matrix that represents
the observable A. The terms c
(i)
k (t) = 〈k |Ψi(t) 〉 and
c
(i)∗
j (t) = 〈Ψi(t) |j 〉 are the elements of certain density
operator ρ(t) defined as
ρ(t) =
n∑
i=1
pi |Ψi(t)〉 〈Ψi(t)| . (12)
For a mixed state ρ is Hermitian, Trρ(t) = 1, ρ2(t) ≤
ρ(t) and Trρ2(t) ≤ 1.
To describe correctly a statistical mixture of states it
is necessary the introduction of the density operator. It
contains all the physically significant information we can
obtain about the ensemble in question. Any two ensem-
bles that produce the same density operator are physi-
cally indistinguishable. A pure state is specified by pi = 1
for some |Ψi(t)〉, i = 1, ..., n and its density operator ρ(t)
by a matrix with all its elements equal to zero except
one 1 on the diagonal. The diagonal elements ρnn of the
density operator ρ(t) represents the average probability
of finding the system in the state |n〉.
ρnn = 〈n| ρ(t) |n〉 =
n∑
i=1
〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 pi 〈Ψi(t) |n 〉 ,
ρnn =
n∑
i=1
pi
∣∣∣c(i)n ∣∣∣2 , (13)
where c
(i)
n = 〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 and
∣∣∣c(i)n ∣∣∣2 ∈ R+. If the state of
the system is |Ψi(t)〉,
∣∣∣c(i)n ∣∣∣2 is the probability of finding,
in a measurement, this system in the state |n〉. The di-
agonal elements ρnn are zero if and only if all
∣∣∣c(i)n ∣∣∣2 are
zero. The non-diagonal elements ρnp expresses the inter-
ference effects between the states |n〉 and |p〉 which can
appear when the state |Ψi〉 is a coherent linear superpo-
sition of these states.
ρnp = 〈n| ρ(t) |p〉 =
n∑
i=1
〈n |Ψi(t) 〉 pi 〈Ψi(t) |p 〉 ,
ρnp =
n∑
i=1
pic
(i)
n (t)c
(i)∗
p (t) (14)
with c
(i)
n (t) = 〈n |Ψi(t) 〉, c(i)∗p (t) = 〈Ψi(t) |p 〉 and
c
(i)
n c
(i)∗
p ∈ C. If ρnp = 0 it means that the average has
cancelled out any interference effects between |n〉 and |p〉
but if it is different from zero subsists certain coherence
between these states.
B. Evolution of a Physical System
1. Schro¨dinger & von Neumann Equations
Each pure state evolves following the Schro¨dinger
equation but the evolution of the system as a statistical
mixture of states described through a density operator is
given by the von Neumann equation
i~
dρ
dt
=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
, (15)
Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the physical system. The von
Neumann equation is only a generalization (and/or a ma-
trix/operator representation) of the Schro¨dinger equation
and the quantum analogue of Liouville’s theorem from
classical statistical mechanics.
2. Unitary Operators
The evolution of an isolated quantum system is also
described by unitary transformations (U is unitary if
U † = U−1). The states |Ψ1〉 at time t1 and |Ψ2〉 at
time t2 are related by an unitary transformation U by
|Ψ2〉 = U |Ψ1〉 . (16)
For a statistical mixture of states the ensemble evolves
unitarily in time by
ρ(t2) = U(t2, t1)ρ(t1)U
†(t2, t1). (17)
C. Quantum Bits and Quantum Registers
A general qubit state in a two-dimensional Hilbert
space whose orthonormal basis can be written as
6{|0〉 , |1〉} is
|Ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉 (18)
with a, b ∈ C and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. In other words, |Ψ〉 is
a unit vector in a two-dimensional complex vector space
for which a particular basis has been fixed. If we expand
this state space to that of a system whose basis set is
described by {0, 1}n we get the definition of a n-qubit
system. The possible configurations of such a quantum
register are covered by
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i∈{0,1}n
αi |i〉 . (19)
The state space of a n-qubit system equals the tensor
product of n separate qubit systems H{0,1}n = H{0,1} ⊗
H{0,1} ⊗ ... ⊗ H{0,1}. Qubits and quantum registers are
used to describe the memory of quantum computers.
D. Quantum Entanglement
Consider a system which has associated a Hilbert space
H that can be divided into two subsystems. Assume HA
and HB to be the Hilbert spaces corresponding to the
subsystems A and B, respectively. The two state spaces
A and B are spanned by |i〉A and |j〉B. The state space
is expanded into H through the tensor product ⊗ of HA
and HB i.e., H = HA ⊗ HB. This space is spanned by
the basis vectors |k〉 = |i〉A ⊗ |j〉B sometimes denoted
|i〉A |j〉B, |i, j〉AB or |ij〉AB. Any state |Ψ〉AB of H is a
linear combination of the basis states |i〉A |j〉B
|Ψ〉AB = |Ψ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉B = (
∑
i=1
αi |i〉A)⊗ (
∑
j=1
βj |j〉B),
|Ψ〉AB = |Ψ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉B =
∑
i,j
cij |i〉A |j〉B , (20)
where cij are complex coeficients which satisfy a nor-
malization condition
∑
i,j | cij |2 = 1. The state |Ψ〉AB is
called direct product (or separable) state if it is possible
to factor it into two normalized states from the Hilbert
spaces HA and HB. A state |Ψ〉AB in H = HA ⊗HB is
called entangled if it is not a direct product state i.e., it
is entangled if it cannot be factored into two normalized
states elements of the two subsystems that compose
the system. Entanglement describes the situation when
the state of whole cannot be written in terms of the
states of its constituent parts. The basis for HA ⊗ HB,
where HA and HB are two-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
is {|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B , |0〉A ⊗ |1〉B , |1〉A ⊗ |0〉B , |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B}.
The most general state in the Hilbert space HA ⊗HB is
|Ψ〉AB =
n=1∑
i,j=0
cij |i〉A |j〉B ,
|Ψ〉AB = (cA0 |0〉A + cA1 |1〉A)⊗ (cB0 |0〉B + cB1 |1〉B),
(21)
where |c(A)0 |2 + |c(A)1 |2 = 1 and |c(B)0 |2 + |c(B)1 |2 = 1.
E. Von Neumann Entropy
& Quantum Information Theory
Entropy [15, 16] is the central concept of information
theory. In classical physics, information processing and
communication is best described by Shannon information
theory. The Shannon entropy expresses the average in-
formation we expect to gain on performing a probabilistic
experiment of a random variable A which takes the value
ai with the respective probability pi. It also can be seen
as a measure of uncertainty before we learn the value of
A. We define the Shannon entropy of a random variable
A by
H(A) ≡ H(p1, ..., pn) ≡ −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 pi. (22)
The entropy of a random variable is completely deter-
mined by the probabilities of the different possible val-
ues that the random variable takes. Due to the fact that
p = (p1, ..., pn) is a probability distribution, it must sat-
isfy
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 and 0 ≤ p1, ..., pn ≤ 1. The Shannon en-
tropy of the probability distribution associated with the
source gives the minimal number of bits that are needed
in order to store the information produced by a source, in
the sense that the produced string can later be recovered.
Suppose A and B are two random variables. The joint
entropy H(A,B) measures our total uncertainty about
the pair (A,B). The conditional entropy H(A | B) is
a measure of how uncertain we are about the value of
A, given that we know the value of B. The mutual or
correlation entropy H(A : B) measures how much infor-
mation A and B have in common. The relative entropy
H(p ‖ q) measures the closeness of two probability distri-
butions, p and q, defined over the same random variable
A. The classical relative entropy of two probability dis-
tributions is related to the probability of distinguishing
the two distributions after a large but finite number of
independent samples (Sanov’s theorem). Since Shannon
[15], information theory or the mathematical theory of
communication changed from an engineering discipline
that dealed with communication channels and codes [17]
to a physical theory [18] in where the introduction of
the concepts of entropy and information were indispens-
able to our understanding of the physics of measurement.
Classical information theory has two primary goals [19]:
The first is the development of the fundamental theo-
retical limits on the achievable performance when com-
municating a given information source over a given com-
munications channel using coding schemes from within a
prescribed class. The second goal is the development of
coding schemes that provide performance that is reason-
ably good in comparison with the optimal performance
given by the theory.
The von Neumann entropy [20, 21] is the quantum ana-
logue of the Shannon’s entropy. It appeared 21 years be-
fore Shannon’s and generalizes Boltzmann’s expression.
Von Neumann defined the entropy of a quantum state ρ
7by the formula
S(ρ) ≡ −Tr(ρ ln ρ). (23)
The entropy S(ρ) is non-negative and takes its maxi-
mum value lnn when ρ is maximally mixed, and its min-
imum value zero if ρ is pure. If λi are the eigenvalues
of ρ then von Neumann’s definition can be expressed as
S(ρ) = −∑i λi lnλi. The von Neumann entropy reduces
to a Shannon entropy if ρ is a mixed state composed of or-
thogonal quantum states [22]. By analogy with the Shan-
non entropies it is possible to define conditional, mutual
and relative entropies. The negativity of the conditional
entropy always indicates that two systems are entangled
and indeed, how negative the conditional entropy is pro-
vides a lower bound on how entangled the two systems
are. Quantum information theory [23, 24] may be defined
as the study of the achievable limits to information pro-
cessing possible within quantum mechanics. Thus, the
field of quantum information has two tasks: It aims to
determine limits on the class of information processing
tasks which are possible in quantum mechanics and pro-
vide constructive means for achieving information pro-
cessing tasks. Quantum information theory appears to
be the basis for a proper understanding of the emerging
fields of quantum computation [25, 26], quantum com-
munication [27, 28], and quantum cryptography [29, 30].
Entropy in quantum information theory plays prominent
roles in many contexts, e.g., in studies of the classical ca-
pacity of a quantum channel [31, 32] and the compress-
ibility of a quantum source [33, 34].
IV. QUANTUM GAME THEORY
For a quantum physicist it is legitimate to ask what
happens if linear superpositions of the strategies in a
game are allowed for, that is if games are generalized into
the quantum domain [35]. Quantum games have demon-
strated to propose a new point of view for the solution
of the classical problems and dilemmas in game theory.
It has been shown that quantum games are more effi-
cient than classical games and provide a saturated upper
bound for this efficiency [35–45].
In Blaquiere’s [46] Wave mechanics as a two-player
game (1980) game-theoretical ideas are discussed in the
context of quantum physics. Blaquiere analyzes the con-
nection between dynamic programming, the theory of dif-
ferential games, and wave mechanics. The author argues
that wave mechanics is born of a dynamic programming
equation which Louis de Broglie obtained in 1923. He
then expresses the stationarity principle in the form of
a minimax principle written in the form of sufficiency
conditions for the optimality of strategies in a two-player
zero-sum differential game. The saddle-point condition,
on which optimality of strategies is based, is an extension
of Hamilton’s principle of least action. Wiesner ’s [47]
Quantum money (1983) is believed to have started the
field of quantum cryptography. Cryptographic protocols
can be written in the language of game theory. Wiesner
suggested to use the uncertainty principle for creating
means of transmitting two messages. In 1990 Mermin
[48, 49] presented an n-player quantum game that can be
won with certainty when it involves n spin half particles
in a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state; no classi-
cal strategy can win the game with a probability greater
than 1/2 + 1/2n/2.
The actual firsts works on quantum games were the de-
veloped for Meyer and Eisert et al. Meyer [36] quantized
a coin tossing game and found out that one player could
increase his expected payoff and win with certainty by
implementing a quantum strategy against his opponent’s
classical strategy. Eisert et al. [35] developed a general
protocol for two player-two strategy quantum games with
entanglement by quantizing prisoner’s dilemma. They
found a unique Nash equilibrium, which is different from
the classical one, and the dilemma could be solved if the
two players are allowed to use quantum strategies. This
was extended later to multiplayer games [50]. Marinatto
and Weber [37] extended the concept of a classical two-
person static game to the quantum domain by giving
a Hilbert structure to the space of classical strategies.
They showed that the introduction of entangled strate-
gies in battle of the sexes game leads to a unique solu-
tion of this game. Du et al. [39] implemented a game
via nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) system. It was
demonstrated that neither of the two players would win
the game if they play rationally, but if they adopt quan-
tum strategies both of them would win. Quantum games
have been used to explore unsolved problems of quantum
information [23, 24] and in the production of algorithms
for quantum computers[51]. Quantum communication
can be considered as a game where the objective is maxi-
mize effective communication. Also distributed comput-
ing, cryptography, watermarking and information hiding
tasks can be modeled as games [52–58].
Azhar Iqbal [44, 45, 59–62] introduced the concepts
of replicator dynamics and evolutionary stable strategies
from evolutionary game theory to the analysis of quan-
tum games. Guevara[63–70] analyzed the relationships
between game theory and quantum mechanics. There
exists a correspondence between the replicator dynamics
and the von Neumann and in general between quantum
mechanics and game theory, their concepts and equilib-
rium definitions. Piotrowski and Sladkowski have mod-
eled markets, auctions and bargaining assuming traders
can use quantum protocols [71–73]. In the new quantum
market games, transactions are described in terms of pro-
jective operations acting on Hilbert spaces of strategies
of traders. A quantum strategy represents a superpo-
sition of trading actions that can achieve outcomes not
realizable by classical means. Furthermore, quantum me-
chanics has features that can be used to model aspects
of market behavior. For example, traders observe the ac-
tions of other players and adjust their actions and the
maximal capital flow at a given price corresponds to en-
tanglement between buyers and sellers. Nature may be
8playing quantum survival games at the molecular level
[74, 75]. It could lead us to describe many of the life
processes through quantum mechanics like Gogonea and
Merz [76] on protein molecules. Game theory and quan-
tum game theory offer interesting and powerful tools and
their results will probably find their applications in com-
putation, complex system analysis and cognition sciences
[76–79].
A. Quantum Strategies
Meyer describes his quantum penny-flip game as fol-
lows [36]. The starship Enterprise faces some imminent
catastrophe. Q appears on the bridge and offers P to
rescue the ship if he can beat him in a penny-flip game.
Q asks P to place the penny in a small box, head up.
Then Q, P, and finally Q reaches into the box, without
looking at the penny, and either flips it over or leaves it
as it is. After Q’s second turn they open the box and
Q wins if the penny is head up. Classically, we can take
(H,T ) as the basis of a 2 dimensional vector space. The
players moves can be represented by a sequence of 2 ×2
matrices F =
(
0 1
1 0
)
(flip) and N =
(
1 0
0 1
)
(not to flip)
which act on a vector representing the state of the coin.
A general mixed strategy is described by the matrix P
=
(
1− p p
p 1− p
)
, where p ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with
which the player flips the coin. A sequence of mixed ac-
tions puts the state of the coin into a convex linear com-
bination aH + (1− a)T , with a ∈ [0, 1]. The coin is then
in the state H with probability a. Q plays his move first,
after P puts the coin in theH state. The question is what
happens when Q make use of a quantum strategy, namely
a sequence of unitary, rather than stochastic, matrices.
The basis for V is written {|H〉 , |T 〉}. A pure quan-
tum state for the penny is a linear combination, where a,
b ∈ C and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1, which means that if the box is
opened, the penny will be head up with probability |a|2.
Since the penny starts in the state |H〉, the unitary action
U(a, b) by Q puts the coin into the state a |H〉 + b |T 〉,
where U(a, b) is U1 = U(a, b)=
(
a b
b∗ −a∗
)
. The initial
state of the coin can be written as ρ0 = |H〉 〈H |. Q’s
action U(a, b) changes the initial state ρ0 to
ρ1 = U1ρ0U
†
1 =
(
aa∗ ab∗
ba∗ bb∗
)
. (24)
P’s mixed action acts on this density matrix, not as a
stochastic matrix on a probabilistic state, but as a con-
vex linear combination of unitary (deterministic) trans-
formations
ρ2 = pFρ1F
† + (1− p)Nρ1N †,
ρ2 =
(
pbb∗ + (1− p)aa∗ pba∗ + (1− p)ab∗
pab∗ + (1 − p)ba∗ paa∗ + (1 − p)bb∗
)
. (25)
The next move of Q, U3 transforms the state of the penny
by conjugation to ρ3 = U3ρ2U
†
3 . If Q’s strategy consists
of U1 = U(1/
√
2, 1/
√
2) = U3, his first action puts the
penny into a simultaneous eigenvalue 1 eigenstate of both
F and N , which is therefore invariant under any mixed
strategy pF + (1 − p)N of P; and his second action in-
verts his first to give ρ3 = |H〉 〈H | and wins the game.
This is the optimal quantum strategy for Q. All the pairs
([pF + (1− p)N ], [U(1/√2, 1/√2), U(1/√2, 1/√2)]) are
mixed/quantum equilibria for PQ Penny Flip, with value
-1 to P; this is why he loses every game. The following
chart explain the dynamics of the game [45]
|H〉 → Q
Ĥ
→ 1√
2
(|H〉+ |T 〉)→ Pσˆx or PIˆ
→ 1√
2
(|H〉+ |T 〉)→ Q
Ĥ
→ |H〉 .
Ĥ is the Hadamard transformation, |H〉 is head, |T 〉 is
tail, Iˆ is the identity which means leaving the penny
alone and σˆx flips the penny over. Q’s quantum strat-
egy of putting the penny into the equal superposition of
head and tail, on his first turn, means that whether P
flips the penny over or not, it remains in an equal super-
position which Q can rotate back to head by applying
the Hadamard transformation, so Q always wins when
they open the box. Q’s classical strategy consists of im-
plementing σˆx or Iˆ on his turn. When Q is restricted
to play only classically, flipping the penny over or not
on each turn with equal probability becomes an optimal
strategy for both the players. By adapting this classical
strategy Q wins only with probability 1/2. By using a
quantum strategy Q can win with probability 1.
B. Classical, Evolutionary & Quantum Prisoners
Dilemma
In this section we will analyze the famous Prisoners
Dilemma from 3 points of view. It is shown how its quan-
tization provides a solution to the problem.
1. Prisoners Dilemma
Two suspects, A and B, are arrested by the police
but the police have insufficient evidence for a conviction.
Both prisoners are separated. The police visit each of
them to offer the same deal: if one testifies against the
other (and the other remains silent), the betrayer goes
free and the silent accomplice receives the full 10-year
sentence. If both remain silent, both prisoners are sen-
tenced to only six months in jail for a minor charge. If
each betrays the other, each receives a five-year sentence.
Each prisoner must take the decision of betray the other
or to remain silent. But neither prisoner knows for sure
what choice the other prisoner will make. The numerical
values for the payoff matrix for the prisoners dilemma
9are chosen as in [75], PA,B =
(
(3, 3) (0, 5)
(5, 0) (1, 1)
)
. The first
entry in the parenthesis denotes the payoff of A and the
second is B’s payoff. This choice corresponds for r = 3
(reward), p = 1 (punishment), t = 5 (temptation), and
s = 0 (sucker’s pay-off). The dilemma arises when one
assumes that both prisoners only care about minimizing
their own punishment. Each prisoner has only two op-
tions: to cooperate C with his accomplice and stay quiet,
or to defect D from their implied pact and betray his
accomplice in return for a lighter sentence. The outcome
of each choice depends on the choice of the accomplice,
but each prisoner must choose without knowing what his
accomplice has chosen. The catch of the dilemma is that
D is the dominant strategy, i.e., rational reasoning forces
each player to defect, and thereby doing substantially
worse than if they would both decide to cooperate. Mu-
tual defection in prisoners dilemma is a Nash equilibrium:
contemplating on the move DD in retrospect, each of the
players comes to the conclusion that he or she could not
have done better by unilaterally changing his or her own
strategy.
2. Evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma
Due to the fact that the payoff matrix for each player
is the same and there are only two pure strategies, a
population with two groups can be constructed. We can
denote the frequency of cooperators by x1 = x, and ob-
viously the frequency of the defectors by x2 = (1 − x),
so the frequency vector would be ( x1−x) . To sim-
plify the analysis consider the concrete example with
A =
(−1 −20
0 −10
)
. This choice is analytically convenient
but not exceptional, the same results will hold for any
r, p, t, and s as long as the ordering does not change.
It is sufficient to study the evolution of the coopera-
tors frequency, since the defectors frequency falls imme-
diately from it. The average fitness of the population is
〈f(x)〉 =∑n=2k,l=1 aklxkxl = a11x1x1+a12x1x2+a21x2x1+
a22x2x2 = 9x
2 − 10. The fitness function for the cooper-
ators is f1(x) =
∑n=2
j=1 aijxj = a11x1+ a12x2 = 19x− 20.
The evolution for the cooperators is given by the repli-
cator dynamics
x˙ = [f1 − 〈f(x)〉]x = −(9x− 10)(x− 1)x. (26)
Note that ∀x ∈ [0, 1], x < 0. That is, the frequency of
cooperators is strictly decreasing. Under the replicator
dynamics the frequency of cooperators will converge to 0,
leaving a population purely composed of defectors. This
indicates that a population of purely defecting players
is a fixed point of the system, and hence D is a Nash
equilibrium. The convergence to a stable point is due
to the fact that the pure strategy D is an ESS. Under
the given dynamic, the introduction of any number of
cooperators to the population will result in the extinction
of those cooperators and return to the stable state.
3. Quantum Prisoners Dilemma
After Meyer’s work, Eisert, Wilkens and Lewenstein
[35] formulated a quantization scheme for the Prisoners
Dilemma and showed that the players can escape the
dilemma if they both resort to quantum strategies. Also
there exists a particular pair of quantum strategies (NE)
which always gives reward. There exists a particular
quantum strategy which always gives at least reward if
played against any classical strategy.
The physical model consists of (i) a source of two bits,
one bit for each player, (ii) a set of physical instruments
which enable the player to manipulate his or her own bit
in a strategic manner, and (iii) a physical measurement
device which determines the players’ pay-off from the
state of the two bits. All three ingredients, the source, the
players’ physical instruments, and the pay-off physical
measurement device are assumed to be perfectly known
to both players. In this quantum formulation the clas-
sical strategies C and D are associated with two basis
vectors |C〉 and |D〉 in the Hilbert space of two state
system, i.e., a qubit. At each instance, the state of the
game is described by a vector element of the tensor prod-
uct space HA ⊗HB which is spanned by the basis |CC〉,
|CD〉, |DC〉, |DD〉, the first and second entry refers to
A and B’s qubit, respectively. The initial state of the
game is |Ψ0〉 = Jˆ |CC〉, where Jˆ is a unitary opera-
tor which is known for both players. Strategic moves of
A and B are associated with unitary operators UˆA and
UˆB, respectively, which are chosen from a strategic space
S. UˆA and UˆB operate exclusively on the qubits of A
and B, respectively. Having executed their moves, which
leaves the game in a state (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉, A and B
forward their qubits for the final measurement which de-
termines their payoff. The measurement device consists
of a reversible two-bit gate Jˆ which is followed by a pair
of Stern Gerlach type detectors. The final state of the
game prior to detection is given by
|Ψf〉 = Jˆ †(UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉 . (27)
The players’ expected payoffs can then be written as the
projections of the state |Ψf 〉 onto the basis vectors of
the tensor-product space HA⊗HB. A expected payoff is
given by PA = rPCC + pPDD + tPDC + sPCD,
PA = r| 〈CC |Ψf 〉 |2 + p| 〈DD |Ψf 〉 |2
+t| 〈DC |Ψf 〉 |2 + s| 〈CD |Ψf 〉 |2. (28)
It is sufficient to restrict the strategic space to the 2-
parameter set of unitary 2 × 2 matrices
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos θ/2 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 e−iφ cos θ/2
)
(29)
with 0≤ θ ≤ pi and 0≤ φ ≤ pi/2. Specificaly, Cˆ ≡
Uˆ(0, 0) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and Dˆ ≡ Uˆ(pi, 0) =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. Cˆ and
Dˆ are the operators corresponding to the strategies of
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cooperation and defection respectively. To ensure that
the ordinary PD is faithfully represented in its quantum
version, Eisert et al. imposed additional conditions on Jˆ[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ
]
= 0,
[
Jˆ , Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ
]
= 0,
(30)
so the operator Jˆ is
Jˆ = exp{iγDˆ ⊗ Dˆ/2}, (31)
where γ ∈ [0, pi/2] is a real parameter. In fact, γ is a mea-
sure for the entanglement of the game. At γ = 0 the game
reduces to its classical form. For a maximally entangled
game γ = pi/2 the classical NE, Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ is replaced by a
different unique equilibrium Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ with Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, pi/2).
The new equilibrium is also found to be Pareto optimal,
that is, a player cannot increase his/her payoff by devi-
ating from this pair of strategies without reducing the
other player’s payoff. Classically (C,C) is Pareto opti-
mal, but is not an equilibrium. Eisert et al. claimed that
in the quantum version the dilemma in PD disappears
and quantum strategies give a superior performance if
entanglement is present.
C. Marinatto & Weber’s Quantum Approach
In Quantum Approach to Static Games of Complete
Information [37] Marinatto & Weber’s introduced a new
scheme for quantizing bi-matrix games by presenting a
quantum version of the Battle of Sexes. In this scheme
a state in a 2 ⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space is referred
to as a strategy. At the start of the game the players are
supplied with this strategy. Then players manipulate the
strategy. The state is finally measured and the payoffs are
rewarded depending on the results of the measurement.
A player can do actions within a two-dimensional sub-
space. Tactics are therefore local actions on a player’s
qubit. The final measurement, made independently on
each qubit, takes into consideration the local nature of
players’ manipulations.
Suppose ρ0 is the density operator of the initial strat-
egy which the players A and B receive at the start of the
game. A acts with the identity Iˆ with probability p and
with σˆx with probability (1 − p). Similarly with B. It
means that each player can modify his own strategy by
applying to his reduced part of the total density matrix
ρ0
ρ
A(B)
f = [pIˆρ
A(B)
0 Iˆ
† + (1− p)σˆxρA(B)0 σˆ†x]. (32)
After the actions of the players the state changes to
ρf = pqIˆA ⊗ IˆBρ0Iˆ†A ⊗ Iˆ†B
+p(1− q)IˆA ⊗ σˆxBρ0Iˆ†A ⊗ σˆ†xB
+q(1− p)σˆxA ⊗ IˆBρ0σˆ†xA ⊗ Iˆ†B
+(1− p)(1− q)σˆxA ⊗ σˆxBρ0σˆ†xA ⊗ σˆ†xB. (33)
In order to calculate the payoff functions PA =
Tr
{
PˆAρf
}
and PB = Tr
{
PˆBρf
}
the following payoff
operators were defined
PˆA = αA |00〉 〈00|+ βA |01〉 〈01|+ γA |10〉 〈10|+ δA |11〉 〈11| ,
PˆB = αB |00〉 〈00|+ βB |01〉 〈01|+ γB |10〉 〈10|+ δB |11〉 〈11| .
(34)
The scheme presented by Marinatto and Weber differs
from the scheme of Eisert et al. due to the absence of
the reverse gate Jˆ which makes that the classical game
remains as a subset of its quantum version. Also in the
Marinatto and Weber scheme it is possible to get the
same results one obtains in the classical version of our
game. Starting from an initial state |Ψ0〉 = |00〉 and al-
lowing the two players to manipulate their own strategy
with unitary and unimodular operators or, equivalently,
through a particular transformation involving two hermi-
tian operators, one interchanging states σˆx and the other
leaving them unvaried Iˆ. By the other hand, asuming
that A and B have at their disposal the entangled state
|Ψ0〉 = a |00〉+ b |11〉 it is shown that both players have
the same expected payoff functions making possible to
choose a unique Nash equilibrium by discarding the ones
which give the players the lesser reward. The entangled
strategy can therefore be termed the unique solution of
the quantum version of the Battle of the Sexes game.
D. Quantum Evolutionary Game Theory
Using Eisert et al. and Marinatto and Weber’s quanti-
zation schemes, Iqbal and Toor [59] investigated the con-
cept of evolutionary stable strategies within the context
of quantum games and considered situations where quan-
tization changes ESSs without affecting the correspond-
ing Nash equilibria. In Evolutionary Stable Strategies
in Quantum Games they investigated the consequences
when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies
try to invade a classical ESS in a population engaged
in a symmetric bimatrix game of prisoners dilemma.
The classical pure strategies C and D are realized as
C ∼ Uˆ(0), D ∼ Uˆ(pi) respectively for one-parameter
strategies and C ∼ Uˆ(0, 0), D ∼ Uˆ(pi, 0) respectively for
two-parameter strategies. And considered three cases:
(i). A small group of mutants appear equipped with
one-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ) when D exists as
a classical ESS. (ii). The mutants are equipped with
two-parameter quantum strategy Uˆ(θ, φ) against classi-
cal ESS. (iii). The mutants have successfully invaded
and a two-parameter quantum strategy Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, pi/2)
has established itself as a new quantum ESS. Again an-
other small group of mutants appear using some other
two-parameter quantum strategy and try to invade the
quantum ESS Qˆ. The results for these three cases were:
(i). The fitness of a one-parameter quantum strategy,
which also corresponds to the case of mixed (randomized)
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classical strategies, cannot be greater than that of a clas-
sical ESS. A one-parameter quantum strategy, therefore,
cannot succeed to invade a classical ESS. (ii). D is an
ESS if φ < arcsin(1/
√
5) otherwise the strategy Uˆ(θ, φ)
will be in position to invade D. If most of the mem-
bers of the population play D ∼ Uˆ(pi, 0), then the fitness
W (D) will remain greater than the fitness W [Uˆ(θ, φ)] if
φ < arcsin(1/
√
5). For φ > arcsin(1/
√
5) the strategy
Uˆ(θ, φ) can invade the strategy D which is an ESS. The
possession of a richer strategy by the mutants in this case
leads to an invasion of D when φ > arcsin(1/
√
5). Mu-
tants having access to richer strategies may seem non-
judicious but even in classical setting an advantage by
the mutants leading to invasion may be seen in simi-
lar context. (iii). A two parameter quantum strategy
Uˆ(θ, φ) cannot invade the quantum ESS i.e., the strat-
egy Qˆ ∼ Uˆ(0, pi/2) for this particular game. The mu-
tants having access to richer strategy space remains an
advantage not any more now. For the population as
well as the mutants Qˆ is the unique NE and ESS of the
game. The invasion of the mutants in case (ii) does not
seem so unusual given the richer structure of strategy
space they exploit and they are unable to invade when
it does not remain an advantage and most of the pop-
ulation have access to it. For an asymmetric quantum
game between two players they showed that a strategy
pair can be made an ESS for either classical (using unen-
tangled |Ψ0〉) or quantum (using entangled |Ψ0〉) version
of the game even when the strategy pair remains a Nash
equilibrium in both the versions. They showed that in
certain types of games entanglement can be used to make
appear or disappear ESSs while retaining corresponding
Nash equilibria.
In Quantum mechanics gives stability to a Nash equi-
librium [61], Iqbal and Toor explored evolutionary sta-
bility in a modified Rock-Scissors-Paper quantum game.
They showed that a mixed strategy NE which is not an
ESS in the classical version of the game can be made
an ESS when the two players play instead a quantum
game by using a selected form of initial entangled state
on which they apply the unitary operators in their pos-
session. Quantum mechanics, thus, gives stability to a
classical mixed NE against invasion by mutants. Stabil-
ity against mutants for a mixed classical NE can be made
to disappear in certain types of three player symmetric
games when players decide to resort to quantum strate-
gies. Stability against mutants in pair-wise contests com-
ing as a result of quantum strategies have been shown a
possibility for only pure strategies in certain type of sym-
metric games. Their results imply the selected method
of quantization can bring stability against mutants to a
classical mixed NE in pair-wise symmetric contests when
the classically available number of pure strategies to a
player is increased to three from two. A different behav-
ior is also observed of mixed NE from pure NE in relation
to quantization.
Using again Marinatto and Weber’s scheme Iqbal et
al. [62] analyzed the equilibria of replicator dynamics in
quantum games. A well known theorem in evolutionary
game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of repli-
cator dynamics but not every attractor is an ESS. The
quantization of matrix games can give or take away evo-
lutionary stability to attractors of replicator dynamics
when it is the underlying process of the game. They con-
sidered the effects of quantization on a saddle or a center
of the dynamics. The quantization can be responsible for
changing the evolutionary stability of an attractor of the
dynamics.
In evolutionary game theory the Bishop-Cannings the-
orem does not permit pure ESSs when a mixed ESS exists
in a bi-matrix game. However, evolutionary stability of
a mixed symmetric NE cannot be changed with such a
control. Following the approach developed for the quan-
tum version of the rock-scissor-paper game, Iqbal et al.
[60] allowed the game to be played with a general form
of a two-qubit initial quantum state. It becomes possi-
ble to change evolutionary stability of a mixed NE. For
a bi-matrix game we worked out a symmetric mixed NE
that remains intact in both the classical and quantum
versions of the game. For this mixed NE they found con-
ditions making it possible that evolutionary stability of
a mixed symmetric NE changes with a switch-over of the
game between its two forms, one classical and the other
quantum.
In the next sections the present chapter is concluded
with the analysis of the relationships between quantum
mechanics and game theory, its consequences and appli-
cations. We will propose quantization relationships for a
classical game, and the quantum analogues of the repli-
cator dynamics and the Nash equilibrium.
V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
Lets analyze some characteristic aspects of quantum
mechanics and game theory.
Table 1
Quantum Mechanics Game Theory
n system members n players
Quantum States Strategies
Density Operator Relative Frequencies Vector
Von Neumann Equation Replicator Dynamics
Von Neumann Entropy Shannon Entropy
System Equilibrium Payoff
Maximum Entropy Maximum Payoff
Physics is a mathematical model which describes na-
ture which usually is represented like a system composed
by n members. In quantum mechanics we represent
and describe the state of each member through quantum
states and the state of the ensemble through a density op-
erator. The system evolves following the von Neumann
equation. A measure of its order or disorder is the von
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Neumann entropy which is also a measure of its entan-
glement. The objective is the equilibrium of the system.
Game theory describes conflictive situations in popu-
lations composed by n players (not necessarily people).
The state of each player is given by its strategy or its rel-
ative frequencies vector which evolves in time following
the replicator dynamics. The purpose of the game is a
payoff and each member struggle to maximize it.
The clear resemblances and apparent differences be-
tween both theories were a motivation to try to find an
actual relationship between both systems. Due to our
interests, it is important to try to analyze deeply both
systems starting from its constituent elements. To start
with this analysis it is important to note that the repli-
cator dynamics is a vectorial differential equation while
von Neumann equation describes the evolution of an op-
erator (or matrix). So, if we would like to compare both
systems the first we would have to do is to try to compare
their evolution equations by trying to find a matrix rep-
resentation of the replicator dynamics. So, the procedure
we followed was the next.
A. Lax Form of the Replicator Dynamics
& its Properties
As we saw the replicator dynamics is a differential
equation where x is a column vector. Obviously, the
matrix U = (Ax)i − xTAx has to be diagonal and its el-
ements are given by uii =
∑n
j=1 aijxj −
∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl.
The replicator dynamics can be expressed as
dx
dt
=
[
(Ax)i − xTAx
]
xi(t) = Ux. (35)
By multiplying each element of the vector x by its corre-
sponding (xi)
−1/2 in both parts of equation (35) we can
get
v = Uxˆ, (36)
where v and xˆ are column vectors with vi =
1
(xi)1/2
dxi
dt
and xˆi = (xi)
1/2 respectively. Lets multiply the last
equation by xˆT and lets define the matrix
G =
1
2
vxˆT =
1
2
UxˆxˆT , (37)
where gij are the elements of the matrix G, gij =
1
2
(xj)
1/2
(xi)1/2
dxi
dt =
[∑n
k=1 aikxk −
∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl
]
(xixj)
1/2.
The transpose of the matrix G is equal to GT =
1
2 xˆv
T = 12 xˆxˆ
TUT , where gTij =
1
2
(xi)
1/2
(xj)1/2
dxj
dt =
(xjxi)
1/2
[∑n
k=1 ajkxk −
∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl
]
are the ele-
ments of GT . We can define certain matrix X as
dX
dt
= G+GT =
1
2
UxˆxˆT +
1
2
xˆxˆTUT (38)
so X has as elements xij = (xixj)
1/2. It can be shown
that the elements of G+GT are given by
(
G+GT
)
ij
=
1
2
n∑
k=1
aikxk(xixj)
1/2
+
1
2
n∑
k=1
ajkxk(xjxi)
1/2 −
n∑
k,l=1
aklxkxl(xixj)
1/2. (39)
Lets call (G1)ij =
1
2
∑n
k=1 aikxk(xixj)
1/2,
(G2)ij =
1
2
∑n
k=1 ajkxk(xjxi)
1/2, and (G3)ij =∑n
k,l=1 aklxkxl(xixj)
1/2 the elements of the matrixes
G1, G2 and G3 that compose by adding the matrix(
G+GT
)
. The matrix G3 can also be represented as
(G3)ij =
∑n
l=1(xixl)
1/2
∑n
k=1 aklxk(xlxj)
1/2. G1, G2
and G3 can be factored in function of the matrix X
and the diagonal matrix Q, qii =
1
2
∑n
k=1 aikxk so that
G1 = QX , G2 = XQ and G3 = 2XQX . It is easy to
show that X2 = X . We can write the equation (38) like
dX
dt
= QXX +XXQ− 2XQX ,
dX
dt
= [[Q,X ] , X ] = [Λ, X ] , (40)
where the matrix Λ is Λ = [Q,X ] and (Λ)ij =
1
2
[
(
∑n
k=1 aikxk) (xixj)
1/2 − (xjxi)1/2 (
∑n
k=1 ajkxk)
]
are
its elements.
Matrix X has the following properties: Tr(X) = 1,
X2 = X and XT = X . Each component of this matrix
will evolve following the replicator dynamics so that we
could call equation (40) the matrix form of the replicator
dynamics.
It is easy to realize that the matrix commutative form
of the replicator dynamics (40) follows the same dynamic
than the von Neumann equation (15). As will be shown,
the properties of their correspondent elements (matrixes)
are similar, being the properties corresponding to our
quantum system more general than the classical system.
B. Actual Relationships between Quantum
Mechanics & Game Theory
The following table shows some specific resemblances
between quantum statistical mechanics and evolutionary
game theory.
Table 2
Quantum Statistical Mechanics Evolutionary Game Theory
n system members n population members
Each member in the state |Ψk〉 Each member plays strategy si
|Ψk〉 with pk → ρij si → xi
ρ,
∑
i ρii= 1 X,
∑
i xi= 1
i~dρdt=
[
Hˆ, ρ
]
dX
dt = [Λ, X ]
S = −Tr {ρ ln ρ} H = −∑i xi lnxi
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A physical system is modeled mathematically through
quantum mechanics while a socioeconomical is modeled
through game theory. However it is evident that both
systems seem to have a similar behavior. Both are
composed by n members (particles, subsystems, play-
ers, states, etc.). Each member is described by a state
or a strategy which has assigned a determined probabil-
ity. The quantum mechanical system is described by a
density operator ρ whose elements represent the system
average probability of being in a determined state. The
socioeconomical system is described through a relative
frequencies matrix X whose elements represent the fre-
quency of players playing a determined strategy. The
evolution equation of the relative frequencies matrix X
(which describes our socioeconomical system) is given by
the Lax form of the replicator dynamics which follows the
same dynamic than the evolution equation of the density
operator (i.e., the von Neumann equation). The follow-
ing table shows how the properties of the matrix that
describe the quantum system are more general that the
properties of the matrix that describe the classical one.
Table 3
Density Operator Relative freq. Matrix
ρ is Hermitian X is Hermitian
Trρ(t) = 1 TrX = 1
ρ2(t) ≤ ρ(t) X2= X
Trρ2(t) ≤ 1 TrX2(t) = 1
Although both systems analyzed are described through
two theories apparently different both are analogous and
thus exactly equivalents.
VI. DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS & GAME THEORY
A. Quantization Relationships
We can propose the next “quantization relationships”
xi →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |i 〉 = ρii,
(xixj)
1/2 →
n∑
k=1
〈i |Ψk 〉 pk 〈Ψk |j 〉 = ρij . (41)
A population is represented by a quantum system in
which each subpopulation playing strategy si is repre-
sented by a pure ensemble in the state |Ψk(t)〉 and with
probability pk. The probability xi of playing strategy si
or the relative frequency of the individuals using strategy
si in that population will be represented as the proba-
bility ρii of finding each pure ensemble in the state |i〉
[63].
B. Quantum Replicator Dynamics
Through the last quantization relationships the repli-
cator dynamics (in matrix commutative form) takes the
form of the equation of evolution of mixed states. The
von Neumann equation is the quantum analogue of the
replicator dynamics. Also X → ρ, Λ → − i
~
Hˆ , and
H(x)→ S(ρ) [63, 65].
C. Games Analysis from Quantum Information
Theory
If we define an entropy over a random variable SA
(player’s A strategic space) [65] which can take the val-
ues sAi with the respective probabilities x
A
i i.e., H(A) ≡
−∑ni=1 xi log2 xi, we could interpret the entropy of our
game as a measure of uncertainty before we learn what
strategy player A is going to use. If we do not know what
strategy a player is going to use every strategy becomes
equally probable and our uncertainty becomes maximum
and it is greater while greater is the number of strategies.
If a player B decides to play strategy sBj against player
A (who plays strategy sAi ) our total uncertainty about
the pair (A,B) can be measured by an external “ref-
eree” through the joint entropy of the system H(A,B) ≡
−∑i,j xij log2 xij , xij is the joint probability to find A
in state si and B in state sj . This is smaller or at least
equal than the sum of the uncertainty about A and the
uncertainty about B, H(A,B) ≤ H(A) +H(B). The in-
teraction and the correlation between A and B reduces
the uncertainty due to the sharing of information. There
can be more predictability in the whole than in the sum
of the parts. The uncertainty decreases while more sys-
tems interact jointly creating a new only system.
We can measure how much information A and B share
and have an idea of how their strategies or states are
correlated by their mutual or correlation entropy H(A :
B) ≡ −∑i,j xij log2 xi:j , with xi:j = ∑i xij ∑j xijxij . It can
be seen easily as H(A : B) ≡ H(A) +H(B) −H(A,B).
The joint entropy would equal the sum of each of A’s and
B’s entropies only in the case that there are no correla-
tions between A’s and B’s states. In that case, the mutual
entropy vanishes and we could not make any predictions
about A just from knowing something about B.
If we know that B decides to play strategy sBj we
can determinate the uncertainty about A through the
conditional entropy H(A | B) ≡ H(A,B) − H(B) =
−∑i,j xij log2 xi|j with xi|j = xij∑
i xij
. If this uncertainty
is bigger or equal to zero then the uncertainty about
the whole is smaller or at least equal than the uncer-
tainty about A, i.e., H(A : B) ≤ H(A). Our uncer-
tainty about the decisions of player A knowing how B
and C plays is smaller or at least equal than our un-
certainty about the decisions of A knowing only how
B plays H(A | B,C) ≤ H(A | B) i.e., conditioning
reduces entropy. If the behavior of the players of a
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game follows a Markov chain i.e., A → B → C then
H(A) ≥ H(A : B) ≥ H(A : C) i.e., the information
can only reduces in time. Also any information C shares
with A must be information which C also shares with B,
H(C : B) ≥ H(C : A).
Two external observers of the same game can mea-
sure the difference in their perceptions about certain
strategy space of a same player A by its relative en-
tropy. Each of them could define a relative frequency
vector, x and y, and the relative entropy over these
two probability distributions is a measure of its closeness
H(x ‖ y) ≡ ∑i xi log2 xi −∑i xi log2 yi. We could also
suppose that A could be in two possible states i.e., we
know that A can play of two specific but different ways
and each way has its probability distribution (again x
and y that also are known). Suppose that this situation
is repeated exactly N times or by N people. We can
made certain “measure”, experiment or “trick” to deter-
mine which the state of the player is. The probability
that these two states can be confused is given by the
classical or the quantum Sanov’s theorem.
1. Quantum Games Entropy
Classically, the entropy of our system is given by
H = −Tr {X lnX}. When the non diagonal elements
of matrix X are equal to zero it turns to the Shannon
entropy over the elements of the relative frequency vec-
tor x, i.e., H = −∑ni=1 xi lnxi. By supposing that the
vector of relative frequencies x(t) evolves in time follow-
ing the replicator dynamics the evolution of the entropy
of our system would be given by
dH
dt
= Tr
{
U(H˜ −X)
}
, (42)
where Ui = [fi(x)− 〈f(x)〉], and H˜ comes from H =
TrH˜ . For a quantum system the entropy is given by
the von Neumann entropy which in a far from equilib-
rium system also vary in time until it reaches its maxi-
mum value. When the dynamics is chaotic the variation
with time of the physical entropy goes through three suc-
cessive, roughly separated stages [25]. In the first one,
S(t) is dependent on the details of the dynamical sys-
tem and of the initial distribution, and no generic state-
ment can be made. In the second stage, S(t) is a lin-
ear increasing function of time (dSdt = const.). In the
third stage, S(t) tends asymptotically towards the con-
stant value which characterizes equilibrium (dSdt = 0).
With the purpose of calculating the time evolution of en-
tropy we approximated the logarithm of ρ by series i.e.,
ln ρ = (ρ− I)− 12 (ρ− I)2 + 13 (ρ− I)3... and [65]
dS(t)
dt
=
11
6
∑
i
dρii
dt
− 6
∑
i,j
ρij
dρji
dt
+
9
2
∑
i,j,k
ρijρjk
dρki
dt
− 4
3
∑
i,j,k,l
ρijρjkρkl
dρli
dt
+ ζ. (43)
D. Thermodynamical Temperature of a
Socioeconomical System
In statistical mechanics, entropy can be regarded as a
quantitative measure of disorder. It takes its maximum
possible value lnn in a completely random ensemble in
which all quantum mechanical states are equally likely
and is equal to zero if ρ is pure i.e., when all its members
are characterized by the same quantum mechanical state
ket.
Entropy can be maximized subject to different con-
straints. Generally, the result is a probability distribu-
tion function. If we maximize S(ρ) subject to the con-
straints δT r (ρ) = 0 and δ 〈E〉 = 0 then
ρii =
e−βEi∑
k e
−βEk
(44)
which is the condition that the density operator must
satisfy to our system tends to maximize its entropy
S. Without the internal energy constraint δ 〈E〉 = 0,
ρii =
1
N which is the β → 0 limit (“high-temperature
limit”) in equation (44) in where a canonical ensemble be-
comes a completely random ensemble in which all energy
eigenstates are equally populated. In the opposite low-
temperature limit β →∞ tell us that a canonical ensem-
ble becomes a pure ensemble where only the ground state
is populated. The parameter β is related inversely to the
“temperature” τ of the system, β = 1τ . We can rewrite
entropy in terms of the partition function Z =
∑
k e
−βEk ,
β and 〈E〉 via S = lnZ+β 〈E〉. From the partition func-
tion we can know some parameters that define the system
like 〈E〉 and 〈∆E2〉. We can also analyze the variation of
entropy with respect to the average energy of the system
∂S
∂ 〈E〉 =
1
τ
, (45)
∂2S
∂ 〈E〉2 = −
1
τ2
∂τ
∂ 〈E〉 (46)
and with respect to the parameter β
∂S
∂β
= −β 〈∆E2〉 , (47)
∂2S
∂β2
=
∂ 〈E〉
∂β
+ β
∂2 〈E〉
∂β2
. (48)
E. Econophysics: from Physics to Economics
Why has it been possible to apply some methods of
physics to economics and biology? It is a good reason to
say that physics is a model which tries to describe phe-
nomena and behaviors and if this model fits and describes
almost exactly the observed and the measured even in the
economic world then there is no problem or impediment
to apply physics to solve problems in economics and bi-
ology. But, could economics, biology and physics be cor-
related? Could it have a relationship between quantum
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mechanics and game theory? Could quantum mechan-
ics even enclose theories like games and the evolutionary
dynamics?
Based in the analysis done in this paper we can con-
clude that although both systems analyzed (a physical
and a socioeconomical) are described through two theo-
ries apparently different (quantum mechanics and game
theory) both are analogous and thus exactly equivalents.
So, we could make use of some of the concepts, laws and
definitions in physics for the best understanding of the
behavior of economics and biology. Quantum mechan-
ics could be a much more general theory that we had
thought. From this point of view many of the equations,
concepts and its properties defined quantically must be
more general that its classical analogues.
It is important to note that we are dealing with very
general and unspecific terms, definitions, and concepts
like state, game and system. Look that the state of a sys-
tem can be its strategy, and the game its behavior. Due
to this, the theories that have been developed around
these terms (like quantum mechanics, statistical physics,
information and game theories) enjoy of this generality
quality and could be applicable to model any system de-
pending on what we want to mean for game, state, or
system. Once we have defined what system is in our
model, we could try to understand what kind of “game”
is developing between its members and how they accom-
modate their “states” in order to get their objectives and
also understand the game in terms of temperature, en-
ergy, entropy, the properties and laws like if it were a
physical system [66–69].
F. The Collective Welfare Principle
If our systems are analogous and thus exactly equiv-
alents, our physical equilibrium should be also ex-
actly equivalent to our socioeconomical equilibrium.
Morerover, the natural trend of a socioeconomical sys-
tem should be is to a maximum entropy state.
Based specially on the analogous behavior between
quantum mechanical systems and game theoretical sys-
tems, it is suggested the following (quantum) under-
standing of our (classical) system: If in an isolated sys-
tem each of its accessible states do not have the same
probability, the system is not in equilibrium. The sys-
tem will vary and will evolve in time until it reaches the
equilibrium state in where the probability of finding the
system in each of the accessible states is the same. The
system will find its more probable configuration in which
the number of accessible states is maximum and equally
probable. The whole system will vary and rearrange its
state and the states of its ensembles with the purpose
of maximize its entropy and reach its equilibrium state.
We could say that the purpose and maximum payoff of a
physical system is its maximum entropy state. The sys-
tem and its members will vary and rearrange themselves
to reach the best possible state for each of them which is
also the best possible state for the whole system.
This can be seen like a microscopical cooperation be-
tween quantum objects to improve their states with the
purpose of reaching or maintaining the equilibrium of
the system. All the members of our quantum system will
play a game in which its maximum payoff is the equilib-
rium of the system. The members of the system act as a
whole besides individuals like they obey a rule in where
they prefer the welfare of the collective over the welfare
of the individual. This equilibrium is represented in the
maximum entropy of the system in where the system
resources are fairly distributed over its members. The
system is stable only if it maximizes the welfare of the
collective above the welfare of the individual. If it is max-
imized the welfare of the individual above the welfare of
the collective the system gets unstable and eventually it
collapses (Collective Welfare Principle) [63–70].
G. The Equilibrium Process called Globalization
Lets discuss how the world process that it is called
“globalization” (i.e., the inexorable integration of mar-
kets, currencies, nation-states, technologies and the in-
tensification of consciousness of the world as a whole) has
a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is tending
to a maximum entropy state.
1. Globalization: Big Communities & Strong Currencies
Globalization represents the inexorable integration of
markets, nation-states, currencies, technologies [80] and
the intensification of consciousness of the world as a
whole [81]. This refers to an increasing global connec-
tivity, integration and interdependence in the economic,
social, technological, cultural, political, and ecological
spheres [82].
Economic globalization can be measured around the
four main economic flows that characterize globalization
such as goods and services (e.g., exports plus imports as
a proportion of national income or per capita of popula-
tion), labor/people (e.g., net migration rates; inward or
outward migration flows, weighted by population), cap-
ital (e.g., inward or outward direct investment as a pro-
portion of national income or per head of population),
and technology.
Maybe the firsts of these so called big communities
were the Unites States of America and the USSR (now
the Russian Federation). Both consists in a set or group
of different nations or states under the same basic laws
or principles (constitution), objectives and an economy
characterized by a same economy characterized by a same
currency. Although each state or nation is a part of a big
community each of them can take its own decisions and
its own way of government, policies, laws and punish-
ments (e.g., death penalty) but subject to a constitution
(which is no more than a common agreement) and also
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subject to the decisions of a congress of the community
which regulates the whole and the decisions of the parts.
The European Union stands as an example that the
world should emulate by its sharing rights, responsibil-
ities, and values, including the obligation to help the
less fortunate. The most fundamental of these values
is democracy, understood to entail not merely periodic
elections, but also active and meaningful participation in
decision making, which requires an engaged civil society,
strong freedom of information norms, and a vibrant and
diversified media that are not controlled by the state or
a few oligarchs. The second value is social justice. An
economic and political system is to be judged by the ex-
tent to which individuals are able to flourish and real-
ize their potential. As individuals, they are part of an
ever-widening circle of communities, and they can real-
ize their potential only if they live in harmony with each
other. This, in turn, requires a sense of responsibility
and solidarity [83].
The meeting of 16 national leaders at the second East
Asia Summit (EAS) on the Philippine island of Cebu in
January 2007 offered the promise of the politically frac-
tious but economically powerful Asian mega-region one
day coalescing into a single meaningful unit [84].
Seth Kaplan has offered the innovative idea of a West
African Union (the 15 west african countries stretching
from Senegal to Nigeria) to help solve West Africa’s deep-
rooted problems [85].
In South America has been proposed the creation of a
Latin-American Community which is an offer for the in-
tegration, the struggle against the poverty and the social
exclusion of the countries of Latin America. It is based
on the creation of mechanisms to establish cooperative
advantages between countries. This would balance the
asymmetries between the countries of the hemisphere and
the cooperation of funds to correct the inequalities of the
weak countries against the powerful nations. The econ-
omy ministers of Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador,
Venezuela and Bolivia agreed in the “Declaracio´n de
Asuncio´n” to create the Bank of the South and invite
the rest of countries to add to this project. The Brazilian
economy minister Mantega stand out that the new bank
is going to consolidate the economic, social and politic
block that is appearing in South America and now they
have to point to the creation of a common currency. Re-
cently, Uruguay and Colombia have also accepted this
offer and is expected the addition of more countries [86].
2. The Equilibrium Process called Globalization
After analyzing our systems we concluded that a so-
cioeconomical system has a behavior exactly equivalent
that a physical system. Both systems evolve in analo-
gous ways and to analogous states. A system where its
members are in Nash Equilibrium (or ESS) is exactly
equivalent to a system in a maximum entropy state. The
stability of the system is based on the maximization of
the welfare of the collective above the welfare of the in-
dividual. The natural trend of a physical system is to
a maximum entropy state, should not a socioeconomical
system trend be also to a maximum entropy state which
would have to be its state of equilibrium? Has a socioe-
conomical system something like a “natural trend”?
From our analysis a population can be represented by
a quantum system in which each subpopulation playing
strategy si is represented by a pure ensemble in the state
|Ψk(t)〉 and with probability pk. The probability xi of
playing strategy si or the relative frequency of the indi-
viduals using strategy si in that population is represented
as the probability ρii of finding each pure ensemble in
the state |i〉. Through these quantization relationships
the replicator dynamics takes the form of the equation of
evolution of mixed states. The von Neumann equation is
the quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics.
Our now “quantum statistical system” composed by
quantum objects represented by quantum states which
represent the strategies with which “players” interact is
characterized by certain interesting physical parameters
like temperature, entropy and energy.
In this statistical mixture of ensembles (each ensemble
characterized by a state and each state with a determined
probability) its natural trend is to its maximum entropy
state. If each of its accessible states do not have the
same probability, the system will vary and will evolve in
time until it reaches the equilibrium state in where the
probability of finding the system in each of the accessible
states is the same and its number is maximum. In this
equilibrium state or maximum entropy state the system
“resources” are fairly distributed over its members. Each
ensemble is equally probable, is characterized by a same
temperature and by a stable state.
Socioeconomically and based on our analysis, our
world could be understood as a statistical mixture of “en-
sembles” (countries for example). Each of these ensem-
bles are characterized by a determined state and a deter-
mined probability. But more important, each “country”
is characterized by a specific “temperature” which is a
measure of the socioeconomical activity of that ensem-
ble. That temperature is related with the interactions
between the members of the ensemble. The system will
evolve naturally to a maximum entropy state. Each pure
ensemble of this statistical mixture will vary and accom-
modate its state until get the “thermal equilibrium” .
First with its nearest neighbors creating new big ensem-
bles characterized each of them by a same temperature.
Then through the time, these new big ensembles will seek
its “thermal equilibrium” between themselves and with
its nearest neighbors creating new bigger ensembles. The
system will continue evolving naturally in time until the
whole system get an only state characterized by a same
“temperature”.
This behavior is very similar to what has been called
globalization. The process of equilibrium that is abso-
lutely equivalent to a system that is tending to a maxi-
mum entropy state is the actual globalization. This anal-
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ysis predicts the apparition of big common “markets” or
(economical, political, social, etc.) communities of coun-
tries (European Union, Asian Union, Latin-American
Community, African Union, Mideast Community, Russia
and USA) and strong common currencies (dollar, euro,
yen, sol, etc.). The little and poor economies eventually
will be unavoidably absorbed by these “markets” and
these currencies. If this process continues these markets
or communities will find its “equilibrium” by decreasing
its number until reach a state in where there exists only
one big common community (or market) and only one
common currency around the world [70].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the evolution of games analysis from
classical through evolutionary and quantum game the-
ory. From the basic concepts and definitions for 2 players
we have extended them to a population and its dynam-
ics. We analyzed the equilibria, Nash equilibrium, the
evolutionary stable strategies and the collective welfare
principle. And some new concepts in game theory like
entanglement, entropy and temperature.
Moreover, the relationships between quantum mechan-
ics and game theory and its direct consequences and ap-
plications. The correspondence between the replicator
dynamics and the von Neumann equation and between
the NE and the Collective Welfare Principle. And how
quantum mechanics (and physics) could be used to ex-
plain more correctly biological and economical processes
(econophysics).
Finally, we presented an interesting result consequence
from our analysis which proves that the so called “global-
ization” process (i.e., the inexorable integration of mar-
kets, currencies, nation-states, technologies and the in-
tensification of consciousness of the world as a whole)
has a behavior exactly equivalent to a system that is
tending to a maximum entropy state. This let us pre-
dict the apparition of big common markets and strong
common currencies that will reach the “equilibrium” by
decreasing its number until they get a state characterized
by only one common currency and only one big common
community around the world.
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